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Colin Gray is a landmark in international studies and this, he claims, is 'a 
landmark work' in his thirty-year career. The sense of fixity is not accidental; as 
readers of Gray's recent essay in this review will be aware, he is an apostle of 
eternal verities and an unremitting critic of all those who (in his view) neglect 
them. A prolific, usually lucid, sometimes playful writer, he is a scourge of liberal 
'fashion' (pet targets include Ken Booth, an editor of this review, and John 
Keegan, the military historian, both of whom he suspects of going soft on 
strategic values). This book is a defence of strategic thought, even if its author 
avows only to 'help readers better to understand modern strategy'. 
As Gray is aware, his career, including a stint as presidential advisor in the 1980s 
during the Reagan administration's extensive nuclear rearmament, might be held 
against his ideas. Gray's record is not, of course, irrelevant to his views. While 
this book contains a (non-specific) mea culpa for 'wrong conclusions' reached and 
even 'wrong objectives' sought (xi), it can also be read (as we shall see) as a partial 
apologia pro vita sua. To read the book as a whole simply in this light would lead, 
however, to a serious underestimation of Gray. He is an able exponent of classic 
strategic views, and proposes a serious argument for their durability. 
The obvious issue is whether this argument works and here I shall concede some 
ground. The more important question, however, concerns not the durability but 
the relevance of these positions. The thrust of my critique is that even if central 
strategic propositions are not - indeed as Gray claims cannot be - simply 
outmoded, they do not tell us, indeed have never told us, much of what is 
important to the understanding of war. To the extent that Gray is right, we 
should still pause to ask - so what? I suggest, therefore, that if Gray achieves part 
of the intellectual advantage that he claims over the forces of soft-centred 
liberalism, it is a Phyrric victory. He wins a battle - that in reality is hardly 
engaged - but loses the war or, to be more accurate, the peace. 
 
 
The ubiquity of strategy 
In order to justify these claims, I shall need not only to penetrate Gray's defence, 
but also to suggest an alternative vision for post-strategic war studies. As the last 
sentence suggests, strategy is everywhere: its grammar of power has infected all 
spheres of social relations and social thought. Even critics will be hard put to 
avoid its pervasive concepts. However Gray claims not this wider triumph of his 
tradition - which has occurred as the century of total war has given way to that of 
the global market - but the viability of the classic tradition of military strategy. 
There is a paradox here. A major, if understated thrust of Modern Strategy is to 
partially detach strategy as a way of thinking from the blood and gore with which 
it has had intimate links. Not, of course, that Gray has any ambitions to deny the 
horrors of war: 'Warfare varies in scale, weaponry, geographical medium, and 
measure of symmetry between foes, but it does not vary in intensity from context 
to context. For people at the sharp end of war … there is only one level of 
intensity, the one that threatens life and limb.' (274). It is just that he doesn't see 
this as what strategy is about and he wants to insist (here the self-justification for 
the Reagan years enters in) that military strategy can be rational even when war is 
irrational. 
Gray's attitude to 'small wars and other savage violence' (273) is a useful entry-
point to his thinking. On the one hand he wants to separate strategy from 
uncivilized excess: 'If torture is exciting, rape is fun, and looting is profitable 
for … "violent actors", it can be hard to find a role for strategy. "War" for fun is 
not really war; it is a form of recreational brigandage.' (277) At the same time, 
however, he wishes to insist that strategy 'can and should make sense of the 
apparently chaotic world of small wars and other savage violence.' (278) He 
identifies twin errors in dealing with this world. One is 'to regard the realm of real 
war and "real soldiering" as coterminous with symmetrical conflict'; the other, 'to 
regard small wars and other forms of savage violence as the wars of the future 
that will largely supplant the allegedly old-fashioned state-centric "regular" wars 
of a Westphalian world.' (279) 
The case for seeing a strategic element in the most 'senseless' violence of 'new' 
wars has been well made by Stathis Kalyvas, who points out that even an 
archetypal case of 'senselessness' like the hacking off of women's hands in Sierre 
Leone had a strategic explanation. As the anthropologist Paul Richards 
documented, the rebel movement depended for its supply of fighters on capturing 
young people. If - handless - women could not harvest, there would be no food in 
the villages, and hence no incentive for captives to return. However the 
intellectual 'triumph' involved, in finding a twisted strategic rationale in such 
brutality, only underlines the limitations of strategic thought. For the clash of 
arms no longer claims - if it ever did - only, or even principally, the enemy fighter. 
Strategy itself has long been turned against women, against children, against each 
group in society, indeed against society as a whole. 
Discrimination and slaughter 
War is always more than indiscriminate slaughter. No one can deny, however, 
that from the point of view of the majority of society (in many regions) who are 
its victims, its indiscriminateness is at least a pronounced a tendency as the strategic 
discrimination practised or intended by combatant forces. It is evident, moreover, 
that this dual character is hardly a product of 'savagery' (as a near-racist 
undertone to the argument suggests) but a fundamental feature of war itself. War 
is both the rational, purposive activity that strategic thought guides and the 
necessarily unpredictable, uncontrollable, irrationally destructive clash of 
opposing wills that real combatants and victims experience - and humanist critics 
emphasize. 
The greatness of Karl von Clausewitz, Colin Gray's hero, was that he enabled us 
to understand the inextricable links between these two sides to war. True, as a 
practitioner, and despite the butchery of the Napoleonic wars in which he 
participated, Clausewitz's premise and conclusion remained that wars could and 
had to be fought. This emphasis was understandable in his time - even later in the 
nineteenth century few thinkers disputed it. Despite the wishful thinking of 
sociological optimists like Auguste Comte, initially industrialism only intensified 
the apparent usefulness of slaughter, the belief in which was not seriously 
contested even by revolutionary thinkers like Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels - 
the latter, indeed, a particular admirer of Clausewitz. 
Like his teacher, Gray does not deny the murderousness of war, but he hardly 
dwells on it, still less sees it as capable of undermining his tradition. And here is a 
problem. Modern Strategy comes almost 170 years after On War. What was 
understandable in Clausewitz is less easily pardoned in Gray. Events in the latter 
part of the nineteenth and, especially, the twentieth century have led many in 
society as well as in the academy to look differently on war. It is with good reason 
that these have not been easy times in which to defend a classic strategic 
approach to war. Gray knows this all too well; but he relishes the challenge too 
easily. 
Historical changes do not mean, of course, that strategy's share of the truth has 
been simpy invalidated. In principle Gray is right: so long as there is war, it 
cannot lose all its force. However the indiscriminateness of 'discriminating' 
slaughter has been deeply intensified, in tendencies that how little to do with 
'savagery' and everything to do with anti-human tendencies in modern state 
power, the enormous lethality of modern weaponry, even dehumanizing 
tendencies in modern thought. Thus there is reason to suggest that modernity has 
deeply reinforced the tendency of 'rational' strategy to produce 'irrational' 
outcomes. 
Gray's index does not include genocide and he would not see the mass 
extermination of civilians as war. And yet the separation of these two phenomena 
- and hence Gray's neglect - is difficult to sustain. The first big twentieth-century 
genocide, the Turkish slaughter of the Armenians in the First World War (often 
seen as laying tracks for the Holocaust), already showed disturbing connections 
not just with war but with the strategic tradition. The common view that the 
slaughter's crucial ideological ingredient was Young Turk nationalism neglects 
the critical role of the military beliefs that its leaders imported from Germany. 
Turkish officers applied 'total war' doctrines, with their ethic of 'annihilating' the 
enemy, to a mass civilian population. The genocide happened, as James Reid has 
pointed out, 'primarily because the military ethics of the time permitted generals 
to view civilians as valid targets of war.' 
Clausewitz was a founding figure of this tradition of strategic thought. Of course, 
to blame him for the Turkish genocide - or for that matter the massacres of the 
Einsatzgruppen and methodical extermination in gas chambers - would be as 
absurd as to blame Marx and Engels for Stalin's genocides. In principle strategy, 
like Marxism, can be distinguished from the ideologies that appropriated it to 
produce mass extermination. And yet, after the experiences of the 'century of total 
war', strategy cannot escape the challenge that they throw at it, any more than 
Marxism can escape disturbing questions about revolution. 
Strategic thinking lent itself remarkably well to mass murder. The struggle against 
the Jews was definitely war for Adolf Hitler, and his forces pursued it as part of 
their larger struggle against the Polish, Soviet and other states. As Williamson 
Murray and Allan R. Millett argue in their new study of the Second World War, 
'From the first day of the war, the Germans embarked on the Führer's ideological 
program to remake Europe's demography.' Nor was this an aberration of the 
political leadership: the slaughter of Soviet prisoners of war underscored 'the 
convergence of the army's ideology with that of the Third Reich.' Likewise in our 
times, with simpler weapons and organization but equally devastating effect, 
Rwanda's Hutu nationalist regime waged armed campaigns against the Tutsi 
people at the same time as against the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Slobodan 
Milosevic planned to expel the majority of the Albanian population to make 
Kosovo safe for Serbian power. Such enormous excesses of both major and minor 
wars may hardly be dismissed as non-strategic violence, still less 'recreational 
brigandage': in each case they were clearly major parts of what these wars were 
actually about. 
Genocide has been commonplace in modern wars. War is the context in which 
genocide has generally occurred. The crime was codified as a result of German 
and Japanese activities during 1939-45, and the success of the victors of that war, 
in erecting a legal barrier between genocide and strategy, must also be regarded as 
dubious. Everyone knows that 'strategic' bombing, reinforced by atomic weapons, 
produced mass slaughter of civilians on a scale to match the supposedly 'non-
strategic' killing of Auschwitz. There were very important differences between the 
motivations and outcomes of Nazi and Allied crimes. But the commonalities 
were profound and should remain uncomfortable for anyone trying to make 
strategic sense of warfare today. They barely touch Gray, for whom even 
Nazism's 'racial doctrine' seems relevant only as a 'simultaneously functional and 
dysfunctional' component of German 'strategic culture'. (148) 
Antitheses of strategy 
For Gray it is only in the context of nuclear war that the problematic character of 
modern force seriously intrudes into the strategic case. Even here, he enters a 
double qualification to Lawrence Freedman's judgement that (during the Cold 
War) 'The position we have now reached is one where stability depends on 
something that is more the antithesis of strategy than its apotheosis. … C'est 
magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la strategie.' First - although at one point Gray appears 
to accept that nuclear war could not 'après Clausewitz, be a rational instrument of 
state policy' (316) - he still maintains that while nuclear war 'must always be a 
terrible event … there are degrees of terrible, and those degrees could matter.' 
(307) In justification of the strategic world that he inhabited in the 1980s, he 
contends that 'nuclear deadlock might have proved a temporary condition, at 
least in the calculations of one side's war-planners. It is not easy to convey to 
readers the full domain of the realm of necessity that engulfed the strategic 
theorists, defence analysts and officials of East and West.' (316) 
Second, Gray offers us the distinction between nuclear war and nuclear weapons. 
'The fact that by the late 1960s a large-scale bilateral nuclear war could not serve 
reasonable political purposes does not deny nuclear weapons classification as 
weapons, nor does it deny that nuclear weapons are a truly strategic 
instrument. … Nuclear weapons can work directly on the source of real action in 
world politics, in the minds of the policy-makers.' (322-23) Here is a curious 
argument. So far as it goes Gray is clearly correct that nuclear weapons have uses 
as means of power short of war: 'To be nuclear-armed probably does not add to a 
country's influence in the world, except, that is, where it really matters.' (330) 
And yet he is too realistic about the relationships between deterrence and war to 
believe that the distinction between the non-war and war-fighting uses of nuclear 
weapons can be absolute. He quotes with approval Michael Quinlan's dictum: 
'Weapons deter by the possibility of their use, and by no other route; the 
distinction sometimes attempted between deterrent capabilities and war-fighting 
capabilities has in a strict sense no meaningful basis.' Hence the strategic 
significance of weapons derives, in the last instance, from their possible effects in 
war. 
What is the continuing relevance of strategy in this situation? Uncontentiously, it 
becomes a means of warning against the unacceptable face of war: 'Nuclear 
weapons have not retired strategy, but strategic reasoning has certainly helped to 
confine the writ of these weapons in defence plans.' (302) Gray adds a distinctive 
caution for our times, which he defines as a 'second nuclear age' of proliferation: 
'The lack of actively nuclear history … has induced a widespread inclination to 
belittle the strategic significance of nuclear weapons. … a condition of nuclear 
incredulity has set in.' (348) He correctly points out the danger of this 'practical 
disbelief in nuclear menace from nuclear-proliferant powers. … not until there is a 
nuclear war somewhere … will these weapons descend from abstraction into the 
zone of pressing problems.' (348) 
The contentious, and less clearly stated, argument is that like his own generation 
in the 1980s, statesman and strategists in the twenty-first century will be forced to 
live with nuclear weapons: 'Overall, the subject of the influence of nuclear 
weapons in world politics is an exercise in attempting to understand the realm of 
necessity - the weapons exist and cannot safely be banished entirely - not of policy 
discretion … .' (330) This is reinforced by the more specific 'prediction' that 'the 
current second nuclear age, which is dominated by the problems of proliferation 
among regional polities, will be succeeded within two decades by a bipolar 
security architecture that pits American against Chinese power and influence.' 
(326) In this 'third nuclear age' as in earlier periods, statesmen and strategists will 
still be 'trapped in the existential conundrum that they may be obliged to wage a 
form of war - nuclear war - that they believe unlikely to have any outcome other 
than bilateral disaster.' (315) 
Putting these arguments alongside each other makes it easier to separate the valid 
from the invalid elements in Gray's position. Clearly nuclear weapons cannot be 
uninvented and so long as they can be obtained relatively easily by any medium-
sized state - even by terrorist organizations - they are part of 'the realm of 
necessity'. However it does not follow that one cold war must lead to another. 
The discovery of China as the new adversary (although a shrewder bet than, say, 
Islam as a 'civilizational' enemy) seems a little too convenient after a decade in 
which Gray like other realists appeared lost for a foe. Still less does it follow that 
statesmen could be obliged to wage nuclear war and produce disaster, even if we 
imagine that some might be stupid enough to do so. 
The China question is crucial here. Clearly Gray is unwilling to rest the future of 
strategy on local wars in places like Sierra Leone, medium-level contests between 
the West and 'rogue' states, or even nuclear rivalries of regional powers like India 
and Pakistan. He needs a big, truly polar confrontation at the centre of the world 
system if the classic place of strategic thinking is to be maintained in Western and 
global thought. Certainly, one possible line of medium-term development is that 
large non-Western powers like China (and India) will utilize their economic 
growth and population to take the world stage as military rivals of a West that - 
although still strong - could be in relative decline. Turn-of-the-century sabre-
rattling over Taiwan (or Kashmir), taken in isolation, could point in that direction. 
It takes only a little imagination, however, to see very different possibilities. We 
don't need to give too much credence to liberal globalizing myths, according to 
which trade and economic interdependence will automatically engender world 
peace. But even Gray should take note of fundamental developments in 
twentieth-century history, which have fundamentally altered the scope for major 
wars. 
The creation of the Western bloc after 1945 and its survival and deepening 
integration - even after its principal enemy imploded in 1989-91 - are striking 
demonstrations of the possibilities of internationalized state power. At the centre 
of the contemporary world system stands a huge agglomeration of Western power, 
which is busily spawning a worldwide web and regional complexes of 
internationalized law and institutions - as well as markets. Non-Western states, 
from the smallest micro-state right up to great powers like Russia and China, 
cannot but be extensively involved in these processes, which are reinforced by the 
democratic revolution which has spread from Latin America and Eastern Europe 
to Asia and Africa. None of this means that there cannot be wars (on the contrary, 
these political upheavals are clearly stimulating local conflicts) or even major 
wars (although this is much less certain). Still less does it mean that the 
accumulation of awesome weaponry will cease to be part of the political self-
aggrandisement of ruling elites. It does mean, however, that in the largest terms 
the stakes have changed. Ironically it is the twentieth century's three major 
military contests, the world wars and Cold War, which are largely responsible for 
this transformation in the role of military power in the world system. 
Thus China's future (like that of other major states) may lie less in becoming a 
polar military antagonist of America and the West, than in a combination of 
political fragmentation and partial integration in Western-dominated, 
increasingly global institutions. We should not underestimate the national 
ambitions of Chinese leaders - or, for that matter, those of the Gray's former 
masters in the American elite. However both can surely see not only the writing 
on the (global) economic wall, but also the overriding need to avoid being 
'obliged' to detonate their nuclear totems. Although rulers cling to nuclear 
weapons as ultimate expressions of power, few find the supremely dangerous 
power play that they were used for in the early 1980s a credible model for the 
future. 
Half-life of a tradition 
Where does this leave strategy? As a way of thinking about power we find it in 
marketing, electoral mobilization, sport, even academic rivalries - everywhere 
that organized competition prevails. In the historic military sense preferred by 
Gray, it faces not rapid redundancy but gradual supersession. People and 
governments increasingly view war as an illegitimate extension of politics. As the 
genocidal character of war is renewed in 'savage violence', there is a powerful tide 
against war in general. After a century in which laws of war have been honoured 
chiefly in the breach, there is a growing tendency for war itself to be seen as a 
'crime' - against humanity as well as against peace. 
The demand for justice in war has, of course, facilitated a limited rehabilitation of 
military power. The overtly genocidal tendency in local wars may be prevented 
by politics and punished by legal action, but it can probably be halted only by 
greater force. If genocide is a form of war against civilian populations, it requires 
opposing arms to defeat it. From the Holocaust to Cambodia and most recently 
Bosnia and Rwanda, genocidal power has been defeated in war - respectively by 
the Red Army and the Allies, by the Vietnamese, by Croatian and Bosnian armed 
forces supported by the West, by the Rwandan Patriotic Front. 
However as Gray's neglect of this phenomenon also suggests, it hardly provides 
sufficient scope for a general rehabilitation of strategic thinking about force. For 
one thing, the new demand for justice in war subjects even counter-genocidal 
violence to unprecedented scrutiny. From condemning war as crime to examining 
the 'war crimes' even within a 'just war' is a small step. Some of those who 
documented the abuses committed by Serbian power in Kosovo were among the 
first to examine breaches of international law in NATO's bombing campaign, 
launched to halt them. If this trend is taken much further, it will be increasingly 
difficult (at least for Western states) to carry out much more than peacekeeping 
operations. 
Colin Gray has relatively little time for 'small wars' and seemingly less for law 
and morality as disciplines within which war may be understood and judged. He 
hinges his case on trends towards nuclear proliferation and renewed great power 
rivalry, which might give new life to the way that strategy operated in the Cold 
War. He is in for the long haul. But it is precisely in long-term perspective that the 
eternal verities are looking increasingly abstract. However valid the short- and 
medium-term scope for military actions of the kind that we have seen in recent 
years, the big lesson that human society has begun to learn in the last century 
concerns limits to the valid use of force. After Hiroshima and Auschwitz, we 
briefly began the task of constructing an inclusive, peaceful world order. After the 
huge historic detour of the Cold War, that is once more the big agenda, however 
hesitantly today's world leaders address it. If we fail, and in the pitfalls along the 
way, classic strategic wisdom will remain a necessary fallback. To the extent that 
we succeed, it will slowly recede to memory and the margins of both politics and 
understanding. 
Thus historic perspective defines a critical difference between Colin Gray and his 
mentor. Clausewitz was a revolutionary thinker, who brilliantly grasped the 
meaning of war in the light of the new phenomena of his times. He defined a 
tradition of thinking about war that dominated, for good or ill, for more than a 
century. Gray is the defender of that tradition now that its time is slowly passing. 
Converting historic truth into truism, he misses the emergent truths of our times. 
 
